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largely designed to serve as aids in ascertaining the testator's
probable intent have no controlling force.3 0
In each case the court should construe each will to effectuate the
pr-obable intention of the testator in light of all surrounding facts
and circumstances, irrespective of rules of construction.
ARON LESLIE SUNA
STATE'S POWER TO REQUIRE AN INDIVIDUAL
TO PROTECT HIMSELF
The police power,1 inherent in the sovereignty of each state,2 en-
ables the legislature to act for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare.3 It is the police power, therefore,
which allows the legislature to regulate reasonably the operation of
motor vehicles upon the public highways.4 Pursuant to this general
authority, thirty-five states5 have recently enacted statutes requiring
'Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561, 178 A.2d 185, 189 (1962).
1R. ROETrINER, THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER 10 (1957)
indicates that "police power" was coined by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827). A classic definition of the phrase was written by
Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851):
The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in
the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.
^James v. Duckworth, 17o F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va. 1959); T. CooLEY, CONSTiTU-
TIONAL LAW 289 (4th ed. 1931).
'Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887).
'Haswell v. Powell, 38 Ill. 2d 161, 230 N.E.2d 178 (1967), appeal dismissed,
390 U.S. 712 (x968). The operation of a motor vehicle upon the public highways
has been variously termed a right, Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416
P.2d 46 (1966); a liberty, Wall v. King, 2o6 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1953); and a privilege,
Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 P. 481 (1931); State v.
Holt, - Iowa -, 156 N.W.2d 884 (1968); Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 133
S.E.2d 315 (1963). See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) and Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) for a discussion of the validity of restrictions attached
to the exercise of privilege.
rALA. CODE tit. 36, § 138 (Supp. 1967); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-964 (Supp.
May, 1968); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1703 (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
14-289e (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3 17.981(1)(b) (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 68-1673 (1967); HAWAII REV. LAWS (1967 Session Laws, Act 214-96); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 49-761(a) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-V2, § 189(c) (Smith-Hurd
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motorcycle operators and passengers to wear crash helmets in order to
protect motorcyclists from flying objects and to minimize potential in-
juries from an accident. The question has arisen in connection with
these statutes whether legislation aimed at compelling the individual
to protect himself from his own careless or potentially dangerous acts
exceeds the scope of the state's police power and abridges the individu-
al's liberty under the fourteenth amendment.
The controversy over this question is illustrated by two recent
intermediate state court cases, American Motorcycle Association v.
DavidsG from Michigan and People v. Carmichael7 from New York.
In considering similar statutes which require the wearing of crash
helmets, both courts assumed that the legislation was intended to
minimize motorcyclists' personal injuries.
Davids, a declaratory judgment proceeding as to the constitution-
ality of the helmet statute, held the statute to be an unconstitutional
exercise of the police power. The statute was attacked as violating
not only the due process and reserved powers clauses of the Michigan
Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2246(a) (Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-5 74(b)
(Supp. 1967); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.285 (Supp. 1968); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
32:190 (West's Legislative Service 1968); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1373 (Supp.
1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66-2, § 195(g) (Supp. 1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. go,
§ 7 (Supp. 1967); MICH. PUB. ACrs (1966), No. 207 [repealed by MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 9.2358(d) (19 68)]; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.974(4) (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
302.020.3 (Supp. 1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263 :29 -b (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:3-76.7 (Supp. 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-18-55.1 (Supp. 1967) (requir-
ing minors under eighteen and their passengers to wear helmets); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 381(6) (McKinney Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140.2 (Supp.
1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 40-105.G (Supp. 1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483-443
(1967); PA. STAT. tit. 75 § 625.1 (1968 Session Laws, Act. 162); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§§ 31-10.1-4, 1-6 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-631 (Supp. 1967); S.D. CODE (1967
Session Laws, ch. 215); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-934 (Repl. Vol. 1968); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. art. 6701 c-332 (Supp. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1256 (Supp. 1968);
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.37.530(3) (Supp. 1967); Wis STAT. ANN. § 347485.(I)(a) (Supp.
1968). The use of crash helmets has been endorsed by federal authority. U.S.
DEPARTMENT or TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL
HIGHWAY SAFETY BUREAU, HIGHWAY SAFETY PROGRAM STANDARDS 6 (1968).
0158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
756 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee County Ct. 1968), rev'g, 53 Misc.
ed 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967).
8"A person operating or riding on a motorcycle or motor driven cycle shall
wear a crash helmet approved by the department of state police...." MICH. PUB.
ACTS (1966), no. 207.
"It shall be unlawful .... for any person to operate or ride upon a motorcycle
unless he wears a protective helmet of a type approved by the commissioner.
Such a helmet must be equipped with either a neck or chin strap and be re-
flectorized on both sides thereof." N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 381(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1968).
1969]
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Constitution but also the due process, equal protection and right
of privacy provisions of the United States Constitution. The court
held the statute unconstitutional without stating upon which of these
grounds it was proceeding. Instead, the court cited two maxims as
controlling: (i) "[T]he individual is not accountable to society for
his actions, insofar as these concern the interests of no person but
himself"' 0 and (2) "'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.' (So use
your own that you do not harm that of another.)". 1 In light of these
maxims the court held that protection of the individual from him-
self did not bear a substantial relation to the public health or wel-
fare. Therefore, the statute was unconstitutional. The court rejected
the argument that the state has an interest in the viability of its citi-
zens, saying that such logic could lead to unlimited paternalism. It
stated further that if the legislative power to regulate the use of the
highways was broad enough to allow the crash helmet legislation, then
it could also justify legislation requiring automobile drivers to wear
helmets or to buckle their seat belts. The traditional argument under
the scope of the police power, that the injured motorcyclist might
become a public charge and that the unprotected motorcyclist might
become a menace to others (for example, by being struck by a flying
object and losing control of his motorcycle), were rejected as too
remote and as not being the real purpose of the legislation.
In Carmichael, a prosecution for failure to wear the required head-
gear, the defendant argued that the requirement denied him equal
protection of the laws, infringed upon his right of privacy and was
not a valid exercise of the police power.12 In justifying the statute, the
court noted the argument that the unprotected motorcyclist could be-
come a menace to others. However, the court specifically held that
the state has an interest in having "robust, healthy citizens" and, there-
fore, that a statute forcing an individual to protect himself falls with-
in the scope of the police power. While conceding that this statute,
just as any statute, may infringe upon individual fights, the court
found that this particular requirement met the reasonableness stand-
ard since crash helmets are widely accepted and used safety devices.
It is clear that the conflict between Davids and Carmichael turns
9MICH. CONST. art. I, §§ 17, 23.
10158 N.W.2d at 73, citing J. S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENTr 201 (1950).
nx58 N.W.2d at 74. The power of the state to compel its citizens to observe
this maxim has been traditionally considered the police power. E.g., Crowley v.
Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
12Apparently these contentions were Federal Constitutional objections.
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on the validity of the maxim that a state cannot force an individual
to protect himself. Apparently the first statement of this maxim ap-
peared in 1859 in John Stuart Mill's essay, On Liberty.'3 The framers
of the Constitution, however, had the maxim's underlying philosophy
in mind when they followed John Locke's implicit assumption that
the ideal government is the minimum government, 14 that is, the one
which places the fewest restrictions upon the individual.1
There has been no difficulty in justifying legislative restrictions
upon the individual where his unrestricted action creates an obvious
public menace. Thus, the state may require individuals to be vac-
cinated and thereby protect the individual as well as the public at
large from the threat of a contagious disease.16 However, a problem
arises when statutes directed toward the individual's conduct do not
have such a clear relationship to the public welfare.
The maxim must stand or fall on the validity of its basic as-
sumption that the welfare of the individual can have no significant
relation to the public welfare. In Mugler v. Kansas'7 the Supreme
Court of the United States indirectly passed upon this question when
it sustained a statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcoholic
beverages. The Court premised its holding on the idea that it is
within the scope of the legislature to determine whether even the
manufacture of liquor for one's own use may detrimentally affect the
public.
The rationale which permits such legislative involvement with the
individual's own welfare has been a factor in employment contract
cases which have sustained legislation aimed at improving the em-
ployees' bargaining position. Holden v. Hardy'8 and subsequent cases' 9
recognized that "the whole is no greater than the sum of all the
"Note 1o supra.
'1 F. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST 107 (1946).
I-"[I]nsomuch that were it made a question, whether no law, as among the
savage Americans, or too much law, as among the civilized Europeans, submits
man to the greatest evil, one who has seen both conditions of existence would
pronounce it to the last: . T. JEFFERSON, DEMOCRACY 6o (S. Padover ed. 1939).
"Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); cf., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S.
174 (1922); Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 32 A. 348 (1894).
7123 U.S. 623 (1887). See also Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304 (1917) (statute
forbidding the possession of liquor); Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900)
(statute prohibiting the sale of cigarettes).
u169 U.S. 366 (1898).
"1West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 3oo U.S. 379 (1937); New York Central
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S.
549 (19i).
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parts" 20 and, therefore, that the individual is an integral part of the
entire population. Thus, legislation aimed at protecting the individual
from powerful employers or even "from himself"21 was found to have
a valid relation to the public welfare. The conclusion to this line of
reasoning was stated in People v. Charles Schweinler Press22 which
held: "[T]he state has such an interest in the welfare of its citizens
that it may, if necessary, protect them against even their own in-
difference, error, or recklessness." 23 However, there was an alternative
ground for the decision as the statute which was considered regulated
the working hours of women and the court noted a special relation-
ship between the health of women and the future health and capacities
of their offspring.
Further evidence of the "whole is no greater than the sum of all
the parts" justification for legislative enactments is evident in the
numerous cases upholding fluoridation.24 Fluoridation of muncipal
water supplies contemplates mass-medication for a non-contagious
malady, dental caries. The individual is directly benefited by the
reduction of these caries. Contentions that fluoridation infringes upon
freedom of religion, by introducing foreign substances into the body,
and violates a right of individuals to decide how to care for them-
selves have been uniformly rejected on the ground that the general
benefit outweighs any rights of individuals not to have their water
treated.25 It is true that the fluoridation cases are distinguishable from
the crash helmet cases since the unwilling individual is imposed upon
'16 9 U.S. at 897; cf., People v. Havnor, 149 N.Y. 195, 43 N.E. 541 (1896),
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 17o U.S. 408 (1898). It has also been recognized
that a detriment to one person will affect others. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S.
86 (1890).
21169 U.S. at 397.
224 N.Y. 395, io8 N.E. 639 (1915), dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 242 U.S.
6W8 (igi6).
2io8 N.E. at 642. The state may also prevent conduct which could result n
the individual becoming a public charge. Territory v. Ah. Lim, 1 Wash. 156, 24
P. 588, 59o (189o). The interest of the state is to have healthy citizens who are
capable of self-support and adding to the resources of the country. People v.
Havnor, 149 N.Y. 195, 203, 43 N.E. 541, 544 (1896), dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
170 U.S. 408 (1898). Contra, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking
down a statute prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries). However,
Lochner has been noted as having little current value as authority. Day-Brite
Lightning, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
AE.g., Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 3o Ill. 2d 504, 198 N.E.2d 326 (1964),
petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 374
Mich. 408, 132 N.W.2d 16 (1965); see Comment, Fluoridation of Public Water
Supplies, 3 HASTINGS L.J. 123 (195).
nCises cited note 24 supra,
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only so that the rest of the population may have the benefits of fewer
cavities. But fluoridation cases do evince the broadening of the
police power concept from so-use-your-own-that-you-do-not-injure-
that-of-another 26 to the-welfare-of-the-people-is-the-highest-law. 27
In spite of the "whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts"
language by the courts indicating that there is a valid interest in the
welfare of the individual, legislatures, in enacting seat belt legislation,
have refrained from requiring use of the seat belts and have required
only their installation.28 Thus, it appears that legislatures have con-
sidered that it is a legitimate exercise of the police power to require
the manufacturer to install motor vehicle safety devices, but not to
require the motorist to use them. 29 The only instances of legislation
requiring the use of seat belts are limited to special categories: Cali-
fornia requires driving instructors and their students to use seat
belts30 and Rhode Island requires drivers of certain specified public
service vehicles to use them. 31 Legislative restraint in requiring the
use of seat belts may lend support to the proposition that the state
has no legitimate interest in protecting the individual from himself.
Certainly, the Michigan legislature feared that it might lack the
power to tell an individual what to do to protect only himself since,
before Davids could be appealed, the legislature amended the statute
requiring the wearing of crash helmets to require only that motor-
cycles be equipped with a number of crash helmets equal to the
number of operators and passengers carried during operation.32 As
a result the State's appeal in Davids was subsequently denied as moot.
On the other hand, it is well settled that prohibition of the use
of such things as narcotics is within the scope of the police power.33
-'Cases cited note 11 supra.
St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 US. 1, 24 (1897); Butchers' Union Co.
v. Crescent City Co., 111 US. 746, 752 (1884).
sSee Note, Seat Belt Legislation and Judicial Reaction, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
371 (1968).
2Whether this situation is the result of legislative uncertainty with regard
to constitutional limitations, opposition of plaintiff-minded legislators worried about
implications in personal injury actions, personal distaste, fear of voter reaction, and
or other considerations is uncertain. Concern about possible effects in personal
injury actions is evident in the crash helmet legislation of two states. GA. CODE
ANN. § 68-1673 (1967) (failure to wear not evidence of negligence); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-140.2 (Supp. 1967) (violation not to be considered either negligence or con-
tributory negligence per se).
VOCAL, VEHICLE CODE § 27304 (West Supp. 1968).
mR.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 31-23-41 (Supp. 1966).
uMIcH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2358(d) (1968 Session Laws, Act 141).
3'See e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAws § 3305 (McKinney 1954); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54-488 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
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In the labor field some legislatures have seen fit not only to require
that employees be furnished with safety devices but also that they
use them.3 4 However, acts more personal in their nature are becom-
ing objects of legislative concern. There are untested statutes requir-
ing water skiers and sufers to wear life belts,35 prohibiting the handl-
ing of poisonous snakes so as to endanger anyone's life36 and for-
bidding the deliberate inhaling of noxious chemical substances.
37
Judicial as well as legislative wariness in this area seems to be
indicated by the fact that other courts sustaining crash helmet legisla-
tion have not, as did Carmichael, sustained the legislation on the
ground of the interest of the state in the welfare of the individual.
Three courts have justified the legislation on the ground that the
unprotected motocylist might be struck by an object, lose control
of his machine, and thereby endanger others.2 8 In addition, two of
these courts noted the possibility that the injured motorcyclist may
become a public charge, 39 while the third said that it is not un-
reasonable to demand that a motorcyclist protest himself on public
property.
40
The two cases in addition to Davids which have declared the
helmet laws uncontitutional have agreed that the statute did not
benefit the general public. One held that forcing an individual to
protect himself deprived him of his fourteenth amendment right of
liberty without due process of law41 while the other based its decision
on a right to wear preferred clothing.
42
It remains to be seen whether the "whole is no greater than the
sum of all the parts" rationale will be employed in other crash helmet
*E.g., N.Y. LABOR LAW § 202 (McKinney 1965) (window cleaners required to
wear safety devices); cf., N.Y. LABOR LAw § 350 (McKinney 1965) (certain industrial
homework prohibited to protect those who would engage in it).
3N.Y. NAy. LAw § 73(3) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
-VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-72 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
srVA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-7o.1 (Supp. 1968).
2People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc. 2d 1o64, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Ithaca City Ct.
1968); People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Buffalo City Ct.
1967); State v. Lombardi, - R.I. -, 241 A.2d 625 (1968). Two courts have sustained
crash helmet statutes on the ground they were reasonable measures for promotion
of safety along the public way. Commonwealth v. Howie, - Mass. -, 238 N.E.2d
373 (1968); People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc. 2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Erie County
Ct. 1967).
3People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc. 2d 1o64, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Ithaca City Ct.
1968); State v. Lombardi, - R.I. -, 241 A.2d 625 (1968).
4°People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967).
4"Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 208 So. 2d 423 (La. Ct. App.), review
ordered 252 La. 269, 21o So. 2d 508 (1968).
"People v. Smallwood, 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967).
